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1 Introduction
Many people unfamiliar with the history of logic may think of the Middle Ages
as a “Dark Ages” in logic, with little development beyond Aristotelian syllogis-
tic and full of scholastic wrangling focused on uninteresting details. This could
not be further from the case. Instead, the Middle Ages, especially at the end
of the High Middle Ages and into the 14th century, was a period of vibrant
activity in logic, in many different areas—the (re)birth of propositional logic,
the development of interactive and dynamic reasoning, sophisticated semantic
theories able to address robust paradoxes, and more. The period can be char-
acterized by a focus on the applied aspects of logic, such as how it relates to
linguistic problems, and how it is used in inter-personal contexts.
To attempt to survey the full chronological and biographical story of me-
dieval logic from the end of antiquity until the birth of the Renaissance in the
space of a chapter would be an impossible endeavor. Instead, this chapter fo-
cuses on four topics which are in certain respects uniquely and particularly
medieval: (1) the analysis of properties of terms, specifically signification and
supposition; (2) theories of consequences; (3) the study of sophismata and in-
solubilia; and (4) the mysterious disputationes de obligationibus. We treat each
of these in turn, giving short thematic overviews of their rise and development.
First, we provide a short historical comment on the introduction of the Aris-
totelian corpus into the medieval West and the effects that this had on the
development of logic in the Middle Ages.
2 The reception of Aristotle
In the second decade of the 6th century, Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius de-
cided to embark upon the project of translating from Greek into Latin all of the
Aristotelian and Platonic works that he could obtain, beginning with Aristotle’s
logical corpus. In 523, he was sentenced to prison for treason and by his death,
around 526, he had completed an admirable percentage of his task, translating
Aristotle’s Categories, On Interpretation, the Prior Analytics, the Topics, the
Sophistical Refutations, and most likely the Posterior Analytics, as well as Por-
phyry’s Introduction (to the Categories). He also wrote commentaries on the
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Introduction, the Categories, and On Interpretation, and his own textbooks on
logic, including the unique little treatise on hypothetical syllogisms (syllogisms
with molecular, i.e., non-categorical, premises). These translations, the first of
Aristotle into Latin, were to shape the path of medieval western philosophy in
a tremendous fashion.
After Boethius’s death, many of his translations of Aristotle were lost. Only
the translations of On Interpretation and the Categories remained. These two
books, along with Porphyry’s Introduction formed the basic logical and gram-
matical corpus for the next six centuries. It wasn’t until the 1120s that his
other translations were rediscovered.1 In the 1150s, James of Venice translated
the Posterior Analytics (if Boethius had translated the Posterior Analytics,
this translation has never been found), and also re-translated the Sophistical
Refutations. The newly completed Aristotelian logical corpus was available in
western Europe by the latter half of the 12th century, though it wasn’t until the
birth of the universities in the early 13th century that they began to circulate
widely (the exception being the Sophistical Refutations which was seized upon
almost immediately). These works established their place as canonical texts
in logic and natural philosophy, and their effect on the development of these
fields was quickly seen. The material in these new texts provided medieval lo-
gicians not only with a stronger logical basis to work from, but also proved
to be a “jumping off” point for many novel—and in some cases radically non-
Aristotelian—developments. Aristotle long remained the authority on logic, but
though most medieval logicians give the required nod to the Philosopher, they
certainly felt free to explore and develop their own ideas.
3 Properties of terms
In the Middle Ages, logic was a linguistic science; it arose from a desire to under-
stand how language is used (properly) in order to assist in textual exegesis. As a
result, from an early period the study of logic was closely connected to the study
of grammar (indeed, these two studies, along with rhetoric, made up the trivium,
the branch of learning that was the core of the undergraduate’s curriculum in
the early universities). William of Sherwood (1190–1249) in his Introduction to
Logic (c.1240) explains that “Logic is principally concerned with the syllogism,
the understanding of which requires an understanding of the proposition; and,
because every proposition is made up of terms, an understanding of the term is
necessary” [26, p. 21]. Hence if we wish to become proficient in logic we must
first become masters of terms, and more specifically, their properties, the two
most important of which being signification and supposition. The period from
1175 to 1250 marked the height of what is known as terminist logic, because of
its emphasis on terms and their properties. In this section, we discuss the ideas
of signification and supposition found in late terminist writers such as William
of Sherwood, Peter of Spain (mid 13th C), and Lambert of Lagny (mid 13th C),
which reflect the most mature and settled views on the issues.
1Dod notes that “how and where these translations. . . were found is not known” [9, p. 46],
nor indeed how and where they were lost in the first place.
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3.1 Signification
According to Lambert of Lagny in his treatise on the Properties of Terms, the
signification of a word is the “concept on which an utterance is imposed by the
will of the person instituting the term” [23, p. 104]. As such, signification is
one of the constitutive parts of a word’s meaning. Four things are required for
signification:
• A thing
• A concept of the thing
• An utterance (which may be mental, spoken, or written)
• A union of the utterance and the concept (effected by the will’s imposition)
A thing is any extra-mental thing, whether it be an Aristotelian substance
(e.g., Socrates the man), an Aristotelian accident (e.g., the whiteness which is
in Socrates), or an activity (e.g., the running which Socrates is doing right now).
On the medieval view, these extra-mental things are presented to the soul by
means of a concept. A term gains signification when it is used in an utterance
and the utterance is connected to a concept by the will of the speaker (or thinker
or writer). The concept imposed upon the term in the speaker’s utterance is
the signification of the term. The signification of a sentence is then built out of
the signification of its terms, in a compositional fashion.
Signification served as the basis for one of the primary divisions of terms
recognized by medieval grammarians and logicians, into categorematic and syn-
categorematic (or, significative and consignificative). A categorematic term is
one which signifies or has signification on its own, apart from any other word.
Nouns, proper names, and verbs are, for the most part, categorematic terms.
(Different grammatical forms of the being verb est ‘is’ are an exception). On
the other hand, a syncategorematic term is one which does not signify on its
own, but only in conjunction with another word or in the context of a sentence.
Now, clearly, these “definitions” are not sufficient to uniquely identify all word
as either categorematic or syncategorematic. As a result, most medieval au-
thors illustrated the definitions of categorematic and syncategorematic terms
ostensively, and different authors highlighted different syncategorematic terms.
Logical connectives (‘and’, ‘or’, ‘not’, ‘if’) and quantifiers (‘all’, ‘some’, ‘none’)
were all recognized as syncategorematic terms, but the list of syncategorematic
terms is longer than the list of what are modernly recognized as the so-called
“logical constants”, and many of them are perhaps surprising. For example,
William of Sherwood in his Syncategoremata (mid 13th C) [27] discusses the
following syncategorematic terms: omnis ‘every’, totum ‘whole’, decem ‘ten’,
infinita ‘infinite’, qualislibet ‘of whatever sort’, uterque ‘each’, nullus ‘none’, ni-
hil ‘nothing’, neutrum ‘neither’, praeter ‘except’, solus ‘single’, tantum ‘only’,
est ‘is’, non ‘not’, necessario ‘necessarily’, contingenter ‘contingently’, incipit
‘begins’, desinit ‘cease’, si ‘if’, nisi ‘if not’, quin ‘without’, et ‘and’, and vel
‘or’. Some of these words, such as infinita, can be used both categorematically
and syncategorematically, and this fact gave rise to certain logical puzzles, or
sophismata.
If a term has only one signification imposed upon it, then it is univocal; if it
has more than one signification imposed on it, then it it is equivocal, such as ‘bat’
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(the athletic equipment) and ‘bat’ (the flying mammal), in English. Equivocal
terms must be distinguished from each other, in order to avoid the fallacy of
quaternio terminorum ‘four terms’, a type of equivocation found in syllogisms.
But univocal terms must also be carefully attended to, for even though they will
always have the same signification no matter the context, these terms can still
be used to stand for or refer to different things, depending on the context of the
sentence in which they appear. This notion of a term “standing for”, or referring
to, different objects is called suppositio ‘supposition’. While a (categorematic)
term can signify in isolation from other terms, it will supposit for things only
in the context of a complete sentence, in the same way that syncategorematic
terms only have signification in the context of a complete sentence.
3.2 Supposition
Signification gives only an indirect way of referring to things, via the concepts
which are signified. In order to refer directly to things, and not just the concepts
they fall under, the mechanism of supposition is used. Lambert of Lagny defines
the supposition of a term as the “acceptance of a term for itself, for its signified
thing, for some suppositum contained under its signified thing, or for more than
one suppositum contained under its signified thing” [23, p. 106]. For example,
the univocal term ‘man’ signifies the concept of man, but it can supposit for the
word ‘man’, the concept man, or individual or multiple men, depending on the
grammatical context in which it appears.
Every author writing on supposition divided supposition into a different
number of types, and distinguished them in different ways, but three main
divisions were recognized, between simple or natural supposition, material sup-
position, and formal or personal supposition. A word that supposits simply
stands for what it signifies; for example, in “Man is a species”, ‘man’ supposits
simply. A word that supposits materially stands for the word itself; for example,
in “Man is a three-letter word”, ‘man’ supposits materially. Finally, a word that
supposits formally or personally stands for actual things which fall under the
concept signified; for example, in “A man is running”, ‘man’ supposits person-
ally. Personal supposition is the most important type of supposition, since it
allows us to talk about individuals.
Both simple and material supposition are not further subdivided. Personal
supposition, the most common type, has many different subtypes. Of these,
the ones that are most interesting are the types of supposition had by terms
which, either by their nature or due to some added word such as a universal
quantifier, can apply equally well to more than one thing. These two types of
supposition are called strong mobile supposition and weak immobile supposi-
tion.2 A common term has strong mobile supposition when it is preceded by
a universal affirmative or universal negative quantifier (e.g., omnis ‘every’ or
nullus ‘no, none’). It has weak immobile supposition “when it is interpreted
necessarily for more than one suppositum contained under it but not for all,
and a descent cannot be made under it” [23, p. 112]. For example, from the
sentence “All men are running”, it is possible to descend to the singular sen-
tences “Socrates is running”, “Aristotle is running”, “Plato is running”, and
2The mobility referred to in their names is a reference to the possibility (or lack thereof)
of “descending to” or “ascending from” singulars, see examples below.
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so on for all (currently existing) men. Similarly, from the conjunction of the
singulars “Socrates is running”, “Aristotle is running”, “Plato is running”, etc.,
it is possible to ascend to the universal “All men are running”. Such ascent and
descent is not possible when the universal claim is prefixed by a negation, e.g.,
“Not all men are running”. Likewise, when the subject term has been modified
by an exceptive or an exclusive, it is not possible to descend. For example, it
is not possible to descend from “Every man except Socrates is running” to a
singular because, e.g., “Aristotle except Socrates is running” is ungrammatical.
Likewise, from “Only men are running”, we cannot conclude of any individual
man that he is running, since the addition of the exclusive term ‘only’ changes
the supposition of ‘man’.
The basic mechanism of supposition explains how terms supposit in simple
present-tensed assertoric sentences. When the tense of a sentence is past or
future, or the sentence has been modified by a modal operator such as “neces-
sarily”, “is known”, “is thought of”, medieval logicians appealed to the notions
of ampliation and restriction. Lambert defines restriction as “a lessening of the
scope of a common term as a consequence of which the common term is in-
terpreted for fewer supposita than its actual supposition requires” [23, p. 134].
One way that a common term can be restricted is through the addition of an
adjective. For example, we can restrict the supposition of “man” by adding to
it the adjective “white”; “white man” supposits for fewer things than “man”
unmodified.
If the modifying word or phrase does not restrict the term’s supposition but
rather expands it, then we are dealing with the opposite of restriction, which is
called ampliation. Ampliation is an “extension of the scope of a common term as
a consequence of which the common term can be interpreted for more supposita
than its actual supposition requires” [23, p. 137]. As an example, Lambert
offers “A man is able to be Antichrist” [23, p. 137]; in this sentence, ‘man’ is
ampliated to stand not only for existing men but for future men. Ampliation
can be caused by the addition of predicates (such as ‘possible’), verbs (‘can’),
adverbs (‘potentially’), or participles (‘praised’). Lambert divides ampliation
into two types, ampliation “by means of supposita” and ampliation “by means
of times”. The former is caused by “verbs whose corresponding action is related
to the subject and said of the subject but is not in the subject—such as ‘can’,
‘is thought’, ‘is praised’ ” [23, p. 138]. A term ampliated in this way stands for
both existent and nonexistent things. Ampliation by reason of times is caused
by modifiers which “cause a term to be extended to all the differences of time”
[23, p. 138]. Examples of this kind of modifier are temporal operators such as
‘always’, modal operators such as ‘necessarily’ and ‘possibly’, and changes in
the tense of the verb.
Theories of supposition are closely tied to considerations of temporal and
alethic modalities (such as ‘necessary’ and ‘possible’) [45]; we cannot go further
into these issues here due to reasons of space.
4 Theories of consequences
The central notion in logic, both then and now, is the concept of “following from”
or, more technically “logical consequence”. The question of which propositions
follow from other propositions, at heart, what all of logic is about. There is
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a distinct lack of any general theory of logical consequence in Aristotle. The
portion of logical consequence which is studied and discussed in the Aristotelian
corpus—the syllogistic—is but a fraction of the field and moving from the study
of syllogisms to the study of logical consequence in general is one of the highest
accomplishments of the medieval logicians.
What do we mean by ‘(logical) consequence’? Modern logic distinguishes
different logical relationships between two propositions. There is the relation-
ship of implication, which holds between the antecedent and the consequent of
a true conditional. There is the relationship of entailment, which holds between
two propositions when one cannot be true without the other one also being
true. And then there is the relationship of inference or derivation, which is the
relationship which arises from the process of moving from one proposition (the
premise) to another (the conclusion) in an argument. While there are certainly
good reasons for distinguishing these three relationships, these distinctions were
not always made in medieval logic. The Latin word consequentia literally means
‘follows with’, and it was used indiscriminately to cover implication, inference,
and entailment. One consequence of this is that the primary evaluative notion
was not validity but “goodness”. Whereas a conditional is either true or false,
and not valid or invalid, and an argument is either valid or invalid, and not true
or false, both of these can be bona consequentiae ‘good consequences’ or bene
sequiter ‘follow correctly’.
The word consequentia was introduced into Latin by Boethius as a literal
translation of Greek ἁκολουχε¯σις. Some scholars have argued that the roots
of theories of logical consequence are to be found not in the syllogistic but in-
stead in the theory of topical inferences [11]. As a result, Boethius’s translation
of the Topics and his commentary on the same were influential. Another im-
portant work of his was the short, non-Aristotelian treatise “On Hypothetical
Syllogisms”. Despite the name, this text does not focus solely on “if. . . then. . . ”
statements; rather, Boethius (and others after him) used “hypothetical” in con-
trast with “categorical”. Any molecular proposition, i.e., one formed out of other
propositions by means of negation, conjunction, disjunction, or implication, was
considered “hypothetical”, and Boethius’s treatise on syllogisms or arguments
using such propositions was a first step towards modern propositional logic.3
The study of logical consequence began in earnest in the 12th century. The
concept proved difficult to properly define and classify. In the 12th century, the
most sophisticated attempt was produced by Peter Abelard (c.1079–1142), a
brilliant logician who produced not one, but two comprehensive theories of log-
ical consequence. The first, in the Dialectica (c.1116), focuses on the treatment
of topics and of hypothetical syllogisms, following Boethius and Aristotle. The
other, later, discussion occurs in a fragment of his commentary on Boethius’s
commentary on the Topics, which is a part of the Logica Ingredientibus (before
1120). Of the two discussions, that in the Dialectica is more complete and clear.
Unfortunately, it also turns out to be inconsistent [19].
Through the course of the next two centuries, logicians continued to wrestle
3It is, however, not modern propositional logic, since the notion of implication or condi-
tional which he uses is neither the modern material conditional nor strict implication, but
is instead based on the idea of subjects and predicates either containing each other or being
repugnant to (contradictory with) each other. As a result, the logical theory in “On Hypo-
thetical Syllogisms” validates many theorems which are not acceptable with either material
or strict implication.
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with the concept of consequence. In the early part of the 14th century treatises
devoted solely to the notion of consequence begin to appear, with the earliest
being written by Walter Burley (c.1275–1344) and William of Ockham (c.1285–
1347). These treatises define different types of consequences (e.g., formal and
material, simple and ‘as of now’, etc.), what it means for a consequence to be
good, or for one proposition to follow from another, and list rules of inferences
which preserve the goodness of a consequence. These rules of inference mirror
modern propositional logic very closely. For example, in Burley’s De puritate
artis logicae, which appeared in both longer and shorter versions, the following
rules all appear, where P , Q, and R are all atomic propositions [3, p. 312–313],
[6]:4
• P → Q ` ¬♦(P ∧ ¬Q)
• P → Q ` (Q→ R)→ (P → R)
• P → Q ` (R→ P )→ (R→ Q)
• P → Q,Q→ R, . . . , T → U ` P → U
• P → Q, (P ∧Q)→ R ` P → R
• P → Q, (Q ∧R)→ S ` (P ∧R)→ S
• P → Q ` ¬Q→ ¬P
• ¬(P ∧Q) a` ¬P ∨ ¬Q
• ¬(P ∨Q) a` ¬P ∧ ¬Q
The 14th century saw the gradual codification of two main views on the nature
of logical consequence, the English and the continental, with Robert Fland
(c.1350), John of Holland (1360s), Richard Lavenham (d.1399), and Ralph
Strode (d.1387) as canonical examples on one side of the channel and Jean
Buridan (c.1300–a.1358), Albert of Saxony (1316–1390), and Marsilius of In-
ghen (1340–1396) on the other side.
4.1 The English tradition
The English tradition (which was taken up in Italy at the end of the 14th
century and into the 15th [17]) is characterized by an overtly epistemic definition
of (formal) consequence in terms of the containment of the consequent in the
antecedent. For example, Strode gives the following definition:
A consequence said to be formally valid is one of which if it is under-
stood to be as is adequately signified through the antecedent then
it is understood to be just as is adequately signified through the
consequent. For if someone understands you to be a man then he
understands you to be an animal [40].
4Note that the medieval logicians did not use symbolic notation (with the exception of
using letters to stand for arbitrary terms in discussions of syllogistic). Nevertheless, these are
accurate and faithful representations of the rules which are found in Burley.
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This echoes ideas found in Abelard’s views on consequences, which stress a tight
connection between the antecedent and consequent, or between the premises
and conclusion. It is not sufficient that a consequent be merely “accidentally”
truth-preserving; there must be something more that binds the propositions
together.5 Such a definition certainly entails necessary truth-preservation, but
it goes beyond it. In stressing the epistemic aspects of consequence, Strode,
and others in the English tradition, are emphasizing one of the hallmarks of the
medieval approach to logic, namely, the emphasis on the epistemic context of
logic and the idea that logic is an applied science which must be evaluated in
the context of its applications.
4.2 The continental tradition
In contrast, the defining marks of validity in the continental tradition are modal-
ity and signification. On this side of the channel, Jean Buridan’s Tractatus de
consequentiis (1330s) [14] provides a canonical example. The first chapter of
this treatise is devoted to the definition of consequence. Buridan begins by pre-
senting a general definition which he then revises on the basis of objections and
counterexamples. The first general definition is:
Many people say that of two propositions, the one which cannot
be true while the other is not true is the antecedent, and the one
which cannot not be true while the other is true is the consequent,
so that every proposition is antecedent to another proposition when
it cannot be true without the other being true [14, p. 21].
However innocuous this definition might see, it is problematic for Buridan, and
others who follow suit, for whom the relationships of antecedent and consequent
are not between propositions in the modern sense of the term—abstract entities
which are necessarily existing—but rather between specific tokens of proposi-
tions, spoken, written, or mental, which only have truth values when they exist,
and do not otherwise. But proposition tokens have specific properties which
interfere with this definition. Buridan points out that
Every man is running, therefore some man is running. (1)
is a valid consequence, but it does not satisfy the definition given, because it
is possible for the antecedent to be true without the consequent, if someone
formed “Every man is running” without forming “Some man is running”, in
which case it would be possible for the former to be true without the latter.
His second revision is to supplement the definition with the following clause
“when they are formed together [14, p. 21]”, but even this is not sufficient, for
consider the following:
No proposition is negative, therefore no donkey runs. (2)
On the second definition, this would be a consequence, since there is no circum-
stance under which the antecedent is true, so there is no circumstance under
5In this respect, the medieval approach to logic shares many methodological characteristics
with logicians who pursue relevance logic projects nowadays.
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which the antecedent is true without the consequent. The problem with the
sentence is that its contrapositive:
Some donkey runs, therefore some proposition is negative. (3)
is not a valid consequence, and Buridan wishes to maintain contraposition as a
sound rule of inference [14, p. 22]. The final revision that he gives does away
with reference to truth-value altogether, and is defined in terms of signification:
Some proposition is antecedent to another which is related to it in
such a way that it is impossible for things to be in whatever way
the first signifies them to be without their being in whatever way
the other signifies them to be, when these propositions are formed
together.6
The problem with a proposition such as “No proposition is negative” is that it
is a self-refuting proposition; it cannot be formed without its very formation
making it false. Self-refuting propositions cause problems for theories of truth
and consequence, and turn up as central players in treatises on insolubilia and
sophismata, to which we turn next.
5 Insolubilia and sophismata
The Sophistici Elenchi was one of the first of the new Aristotelian works trans-
lated in the middle of the 12th century to gain a wide readership [9, p. 69]. The
study of fallacies and sophistical reasoning held the same draw in the Middle
Ages as it did in ancient Greece and in modern times: It is not sufficient to know
how to reason properly (as is taught via the syllogism in the Prior Analytics);
in order to win in a dispute, one must also be able to recognize when one’s
opponent is reasoning improperly. This gave rise to the study of insolubiliae
‘insoluble sentences’ and sophismata ‘sophisms’.
The medieval genre of sophismata-literature developed in the 12th century
and was firmly established in both grammatical and logical contexts by the end
of that century [2, p. 518]. In the context of logic, a sophisma or insoluble is
a problematic sentence, a sentence whose analysis either leads to an apparent
contradiction, or for which two equally plausible analyses can be given, one for
its truth and one for its falsity.7 Treatises on sophisms generally followed a
similar framework:
1. The sophism is stated, sometimes along with a casus, a hypothesis about
how the world is, or extra information about how the sophism should be
analyzed.
2. An argument for its truth and an argument for its falsity are presented.
6Buridan is not entirely content with this definition either, but this has to do with his
theory of truth, rather than any problem with the definition itself, and we do not have the
space to go into these problems here. But cf. [14] and [16].
7In this section, we group insolubilia and sophismata in our discussion, even though his-
torians of logic will sometimes try to bifurcate the two (cf., e.g., [37] and [30]. Both of the
terms are somewhat wider in scope than modern ‘paradox’, which implies some sort of logical
contradiction. Not all insolubles are in fact unsolvable; rather, they are so named because
they are difficult to solve. And not all sophisms involve the use of sophistical (i.e., fallacious)
reasoning.
9
3. There is a claim about the truth value of the sophisma.
4. The apparent contradiction is resolved by explaining why the arguments
supporting the opposite solution are wrong.
The result is a sentence which has a definite truth value under the casus (if one
is given).
Many sophisms dealt with paradoxes that arise from logical predicates, such
as truth, necessity, validity, etc. Medieval logicians recognized the importance of
the task of providing non-trivial and non-ad hoc resolutions to these insolubles
and sophisms. The most productive era in the theory of insolubles was from
1320 to 1350. During this period, many treatises on insolubilia and sophismata
were written, and discussions of insoluble sentences appeared in other, non-
dedicated works, too. Some of the most important authors writing on the topic
during this period include Thomas Bradwardine (c.1295–1349), Richard Kilv-
ington (d.1361), Roger Swyneshed (d.1365), William Heytesbury (c.1310–1372),
John Wyclif (c.1330–1384), and Peter of Ailly (1351–1420). In the remainder of
this section, we discuss (1) the liar paradox and related insolubles, (2) sophisms
relating to validity and logical consequence, and (3) other types of sophisms and
insolubles.
5.1 The liar paradox
The most famous insoluble is the liar paradox:
This sentence is false. (4)
The earliest known medieval formulation of the paradox is in Adam of Balsham’s
Ars disserendi (1132). However, Adam “says nothing whatever to indicate that
he was aware of the very special problems they pose, that they were current
topics of philosophical discussion in his day, or how one might go about trying
to answer those questions” [34, p. 25]. It wasn’t until the later part of the 12th
century that the problematic aspects of the liar sentence (and related sentences)
were taken up in earnest. Over the course of the next two centuries, many
attempts to solve the paradox were provided. These solutions can be divided
into the following five families: (1) classification under the fallacy secundum
quid et simpliciter ; (2) transcasus theories, (3) distinguishing between the actus
exercitus ‘exercised act’ and the actus significatus ‘signified act’; (4) restrictio
theories; and (5) casatio theories.
Secundum quid et simpliciter. This is Aristotle’s solution. In chapter 25
of the Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle makes a distinction between “arguments
which depend upon an expression that is valid of a particular thing, or in a
particular respect, or place, or manner, or relation, and not valid absolutely”
[1], that is, between expressions which are valid secundum quid ‘according to
something’ and those which are valid simpliciter ‘simply’ (or ‘absolutely’). He
goes on to say:
Is it possible for the same man at the same time to be a keeper and
a breaker of his oath?. . . If a man keeps his oath in this particular
instance or in this particular respect, is he bound also to be a keeper
of oaths absolutely, but he who swears that he will break his oath,
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and then breaks it, keeps this particular oath only; he is not a keeper
of his oath. . . The argument is similar, also, as regards the problem
whether the same man can at the same time say what is both false
and true: but it appears to be a troublesome question because it is
not easy to see in which of the two connexions the word ‘absolutely’
is to be rendered—with ‘true’ or with ‘false’. There is, however,
nothing to prevent it from being false absolutely, though true in
some particular respect or relation, i.e. being true in some things,
though not ‘true’ absolutely [1].
How this solves the paradox is not entirely clear; on this view, the Liar sentence
can apparently be solved both ways. Many medieval logicians who adopted the
Aristotelian reply argued that the Liar is false simpliciter, and true secundum
quid ; however, it was left unspecified with respect to what quid it is true.
Transcasus. The Latin word transcasus has no straightforward translation
into English. It is a literal translation of Greek μεταpiτωσις ‘a change, trans-
ferring’. Conceptually, it is related to the Stoic notion of μεταpiιpiτωντα, from
the same root, which are propositions whose truth value change over time [37].
In transcasus, it is not that the truth value of the liar sentence changes, but
rather, what the sentence refers to (and hence how its truth value should be
evaluated). On such solutions, when someone says “I am speaking a falsehood”,
the sentence is not self-referential but instead refers to what that person said
immediately prior. If he didn’t say anything before, then the liar sentence is
just false.
The actus exercitus and the actus significatus. This solution takes
advantage of the fact that the liar sentence (as usually formulated in medieval
treatises) involves assertion: I say “I am saying something false”, or Plato says
“Plato is saying something false”, or similar. When such an assertion is made,
it is possible to distinguish between what the speaker says he is doing (signified
act) and what he is actually doing (exercised act). This view, which is not well
understood, is espoused by Johannes Duns Scotus in his Questiones super libro
elenchorum (c.1295), who says that the exercised act of the liar is “speaking the
truth” and the signified act of the liar is “speaking a falsehood” [10]. Because
the liar sentence expresses something which is not true, it is false.
Restrictio. Restriction solutions are the most straightforward: By restrict-
ing the allowed grammatical/syntactic forms to disbar self-referential sentences,
it is possible to rule the liar paradox as without truth-value because it is self-
referential (ungrammatical). In [32], Spade discusses 71 different texts dealing
with the liar paradox. Fourteen of these texts espouse some type of restric-
tion theory, either explicitly or implicitly. These include a number of mid- to
late-14th century anonymous treatises, as well as treatises by well-known logi-
cians such as Walter Burley, in his Insolubilia (before 1320) [31] and William of
Ockham, in his Summa logicae (1324–1327) [24] and his Tractatus super libros
elenchorum (before 1328) [25].
Restriction solutions exist across a broad spectrum, ranging from very weak,
forbidding only a small amount of self-reference, to very strong, forbidding all
self-reference. On such strong restriction theories, not only does it turn out that
the liar has no truth value, but so also such insolubles as the linked liars:
Plato: What Socrates says is false (5)
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Socrates: What Plato says is false (6)
as well as seemingly non-paradoxical sentences which just happen to be self-
referential, such as:
This sentence has five words. (7)
Cassatio. The Latin word cassatio means to make null or void, or to cancel.
On the view of the cassators, when you are uttering an insoluble, you are saying
nothing; the paradoxicality of the sentence cancels out any meaning it might
have had. Therefore an insoluble like the liar has the same truth value as the
empty utterance: none. This solution was favored in the early period, and died
out by the 1220s, though it continued to be mentioned in later catalogs of types
of solutions [37, §2.5].
In addition to the liar and the linked liars, other liar-like insolubles were also
considered. For example, suppose that Plato promises to give everyone who tells
the truth a penny. Socrates then announces “You won’t give me a penny”. Or
similarly, Plato is guarding a bridge, and will let only those who tell the truth
cross; anyone who tells a lie will be thrown into the water. Socrates approaches
and “You will throw me from the bridge”. Both of these present the same
problems for analysis as the liar paradox, though it is clear that they cannot be
solved in similar ways (for example, restriction strategies make no sense here,
since there is no self- or cross-reference).8
5.2 Paradoxes of validity
Earlier we mentioned some of the problems that arise in the analysis of propo-
sitions such as “No proposition is negative”. In chapter 8 of his Sophismata
[5], Buridan considers the related inferences “Every proposition is affirmative,
therefore no proposition is negative” and “No proposition is negative, therefore
some proposition is negative”. These inferences are problematic, because, on
the one hand, the antecedent is either the contrary or the contradictory of the
consequent, so any time it is true the consequent will have to be false, according
to the rules in the Square of Opposition; and on the other hand, “No propo-
sition is negative” is itself a negative proposition, and any time that it exists,
some negative proposition will exist, and thus some proposition will be nega-
tive. Nevertheless, it is not impossible that there be no negative propositions;
as Buridan points out, “ ‘Every proposition is affirmative’ would be true if God
annihilated all negatives, and then the consequent [of the first inference] would
not be true, for it would not be” [5, p. 953]. This analysis leads Buridan to
make an interesting distinction: He concludes that such a proposition “is pos-
sible, although it cannot be true” [5, p. 956], that is, he distinguishes between
being “possible” and being “possibly-true”; a proposition can be one without
being the other.
Other paradoxes of validity include self-referential propositions, but unlike
the liar sentence they involve logical predicates other than truth. For exam-
ple, Pseudo-Scotus offers a counterexample to Buridan’s definition of logical
consequence in terms of necessary truth preservation (cf. §4.2 above) [48]:
God exists, hence this argument is invalid. (8)
8Both of these examples are adapted from Peter of Ailly’s Insolubilia [20].
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Under standard medieval metaphysical and ontological assumptions, “God ex-
ists” is a necessary truth.9 Suppose, then that (8) is valid. The antecedent is
not only true, but necessarily true. However, if the argument is valid, then the
consequent is false, since it asserts that the argument is invalid. But then the
argument is not truth-preserving, and so cannot be valid. But if the argument
is invalid, then it is necessarily invalid, and as a result the consequent is nec-
essary. But a necessary truth following from a necessary truth is necessarily a
valid inference, and thus (8) is valid.
Similar paradoxes can be leveled against Buridan’s final definition, in terms
of signification, too. For example, the definition is adequate for the counter-
example that it was designed to obviate, but would have problems dealing with
the following conference:
The consequent of (9) does not signify as is the case,
therefore, the consequent of (9) does not signify as is the case. (9)
While this precise example is not found, similar ideas are treated by Roger
Swyneshed in his Insolubilia (1330x1335) [33].
5.3 Other classes of insolubilia and sophismata
In this section we briefly catalog other common types of insolubilia and sophis-
mata.
(1) Sophisms which arise from exponibilia ‘exponible [terms]’. An exponible
term is one whose analysis requires breaking the sentence in which it appears
down into a collection of sentences, each of which are simpler in form. A common
example of a pair of exponible terms are incipit ‘begins’ and desinit ‘ceases’.
There are two ways that a sentence such as “Socrates begins to be white” can
be analysed:
Socrates is not white at time t,
and t is the last moment at which he is not white. (10)
Socrates is not white at time t,
and t′ is the first moment at which he is white. (11)
Confusing the two ways that such sentences can be expounded can result in
sophisms. Such sophisms are discussed by William Heytesbury in his Regulae
solvendi sophismata (1335) [12, 47] and Richard Kilvington in his Sophismata
(before 1325) [15].
(2) Sophisms which arise from confusing the syncategorematic and categore-
matic uses of terms. The most common example is Infinita est finita, where in-
finita can be interpreted either categorematically or syncategorematically. This
sentence is difficult to translate into English without losing the ambiguity; when
infinita is used categorematically, it is taken as a substantive noun, ‘the infinite’,
9In fact, when it shows up in logical examples, it is almost always being used as a ‘generic’
logical truth, rather like p ∨ ¬p. Nothing important turns on the fact that this proposition is
about God.
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and then the sentence says that ‘the infinite is finite’, which is false. But syncat-
egorematically, it is taken adjectivally, and means that ‘infinite are the finite’,
i.e., ‘there are infinitely many finite things’, which is true, e.g., numbers. Illicit
shifts between the categorematic reading and the syncategorematic reading can
lead to paralogisms and sophisms. Heytesbury discusses this in his treatise De
sensu composito et diviso (before 1335) [13].
(3) Sophisms which arise from infelicities of presupposition and supposition.
A typical example of these is “Socrates promises Plato a horse” (or in some
cases, a penny), and yet for any given horse (or penny), it is not the case that
Socrates has promised Plato this horse.
(4) Sophisms which arise from the re-imposition of terms, stipulating that
they signify things other than their ordinary signification. We see examples of
these in the next section.
Finally, we would be remiss in not mentioning (5) sophisms which illustrate
that the more things change, the more things stay the same, or, more precisely,
that medieval humor isn’t all that different from modern humor, and that is
the class of sophisms whose conclusion is Tu es asinus “You are an ass”. One
example of such is the paralogism: “This donkey is yours, this donkey is a father,
therefore this donkey is your father”, and if your father is a donkey, then you
are one as well.
6 Obligational disputations
The final area of medieval logic that we cover in this chapter is the most peculiar
and the most unfamiliar. While theories of meaning and reference, systems of
logical consequence, and the study of paradoxes and sophistical reasoning are all
part and parcel of the modern study of logic and philosophy of language, there is
no such counterpart for the uniquely medieval genre of disputationes de obliga-
tionibus. The earliest treatises on these disputations are anonymous, and date
from the first decades of the 13th century. In the following two centuries, scores
of treatises on obligations were written, including ones by William of Sherwood,
Nicholas of Paris (fl.1250), Walter Burley, Roger Swyneshed, Richard Kilving-
ton, William of Ockham, Albert of Saxony, John of Wesel (1340/50s), Robert
Fland, John of Holland, Richard Brinkley (fl.1365–1370), Richard Lavenham,
Ralph Strode, Peter of Ailly, Peter of Candia (late 14th C), Peter of Mantua
(d.1399), Paul of Venice (c.1369–1429), and Paul of Pergola (d.1455).
So what are these mysterious disputations, and why are they mysterious?
An obligatio is a dispute between two players, an Opponent and a Respon-
dent. The Opponent puts forward propositions (one at a time, or in collections,
depending on different author’s rules), and the Respondent is obliged (hence the
name) to follow certain rules in his responses to these propositions. These rules
depend on the type of disputation; we give an example of one type below in §6.1
(which the reader can consult now to have a sense of what we are talking about).
Early authors distinguish six types, or species, of obligationes: (1) positio ‘posit-
ing’, (2) depositio ‘de-positing’ (a type of denial), (3) dubitatio ‘doubting’, (4)
petitio ‘petition’, (5) impositio ‘imposition’, and (6) sit verum ‘let it be true’.
Later authors argued that some of these types could be derived from the others
and so reduced the number of species, generally to three [43, §4]. They are
mysterious because their background and their purpose is unclear. Early texts
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allude to Aristotle’s three-fold division of disputations in Book VIII, chapter 4 of
the Topics (cf., e.g., Walter Burley’s De obligationibus (c.1302) [7]). There are
indications in other texts that show that the medieval authors were interested in
developing obligationes in the tradition of disputations as described in the Top-
ics—not only in motivating the genre but also in discussions concerning what
type of disputations obligationes are [43, §2]. Modern scholars have advanced
many hypotheses about the purpose of these disputations. In our opinion, no
single answer is going to tell the whole story. It is clear—certain texts tell us
so explicitly [8]—that obligationes were used as training exercises for students.
That there is a close connection between obligationes and insolubilia-literature
is also clear given the use of obligationes-language in treatises on insolubles and
sophisms [15, 18]. While the idea that obligationes were developed as a type
of counterfactual reasoning is not in general tenable, it can be justified in some
specific contexts [44].
The general procedure followed in the disputations did not vary drastically
from author to author or type to type. The Respondent had three (in some
cases, four) possible responses: concede, deny, or doubt (some authors also al-
lowed him to draw distinctions in the case of ambiguous propositions). Which
response was the correct response depended, in part, on whether the proposition
was relevant (or pertinent) or irrelevant (or impertinent). In the tradition of
Walter Burley, which came to be termed the responsio vetus ‘the old response’,
a proposition was defined as relevant if it, or its negation, followed from the
conjunction of all the propositions conceded along with the negations of all de-
nied. On this definition, the set of relevant sentences potentially changed with
each step of the disputation. Such a definition can also be found in the works of
William of Sherwood, Ralph Strode, and Peter of Candia. This dynamic con-
ception of relevance resulted in a number of consequences that later authors,
particularly Roger Swyneshed, found problematic. Swyneshed, in what came to
be termed the responsio nova ‘new response’, redefined relevance in his Obliga-
tiones (1330x1335) [35] into a static notion, where a proposition is relevant if
it or its negation follows from the positum (the first proposition of the dispu-
tation), and is irrelevant otherwise. It is clear that on this definition, whether
a proposition is relevant or not does not change with the course of the dispu-
tation. Swyneshed was followed in this redefinition by Robert Fland, Richard
Lavenham, and John of Wesel, among others.
Regardless of which definition of relevance was used, the following general
rules were accepted by everyone:
• A relevant proposition should be conceded if it follows, and denied if its
negation follows.
• An irrelevant proposition should be conceded if it is (known to be) true,
denied if it is (known to be) false, and doubted if it is neither (known to
be) true nor (known to be) false.
6.1 Positio
Positio is the crown jewel of the obligationes regalia. It is the most prominently
discussed, by both medieval and modern authors. Positio can be divided into
multiple types. The first division is into possible and impossible positio; both
divisions are further divided as to whether the proposition is simple or complex,
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Opponent Respondent
1 ϕ. I admit it.
2 ¬ϕ ∨ ψ. I grant it.
3 ψ I grant it.
Figure 1: A simple example.
and then further as to whether the complex propositions are formed by con-
junction (“conjoined positio”) or disjunction (“indeterminate positio”). In any
of these types of positio, it is also possible that a further stipulation is added, in
which case the positio is called “dependent” [7, p. 378]. Most texts focus their
discussion on possible positio.
The rules given above are, in slightly simplified form, Burley’s rules for po-
sitio. These rules exhaustively cover all of the possibilities that the Respondent
may face in the course of the disputation; how these rules play out in the context
of actual disputations is made clear in Burley’s examples, which are typical of
13th century developments. Due to issues of space, we cannot follow this up
with a discussion of the later 14th century developments, but instead direct the
reader to [43, §§4.2, 4.3].
We consider an example positio which appears, with slight variation, in many
13th-century treatises. It is fairly simple but illustrates Burley’s rules nicely.
Suppose that ϕ does not imply ¬ψ and ϕ is known to be false; for example, let ϕ
be ‘The capitol of England is Paris’ and ψ is ‘It is raining’. Since ϕ is satisfiable
(because if it were not, then it would imply ¬ψ), the Respondent should admit
it when it is put forward as a positum. In the second round, Opponent asserts
¬ϕ ∨ ψ. Now, either ϕ implies ψ, in which case the proposition follows from
the positum and hence the Respondent should concede it, or ψ is independent
of ϕ, and hence the proposition is irrelevant. In that case, we know that since
ϕ is false, ¬ϕ is true, so the disjunction is true, and true irrelevant propositions
should be conceded. But then, ψ follows from the positum along with something
correctly conceded, and hence when the Opponent asserts ψ, the Respondent
must concede it too.
This example shows how, given a positum which is false, but not contradic-
tory, the Opponent can force the Respondent to concede any other proposition
consistent with it. The fact that this is possible is one of Swyneshed’s primary
motivations for revising the standard rules. Further formal properties, following
from the assumption of a consistent positum (which is the definition of possible
positio), include that no disputation requires the Respondent to concede ϕ in
one round and to concede ¬ϕ in another round (or to concede ϕ in one round
and to deny it in another); the set of formulas conceded, along with the nega-
tions of those denied, will always be a consistent set; yet, it may be that the
Respondent has to give different answers to the same propositions put forward
at different times.
6.2 Depositio.
Depositio is just like positio, except that the Respondent is obliged to deny or
reject the initial proposition (the depositum). A depositio with depositum ϕ
will be completely symmetric to a positio with ¬ϕ as the positum. Nevertheless,
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early treatises on obligationes, such as that by Nicholas of Paris which dates
from c.1230–50, still treat depositio at some length.
6.3 Dubitatio.
In dubitatio, the Respondent must doubt the statement that the Opponent puts
forward (called the dubitatum). While dubitatio was discussed in 13th century
texts, often at some length, later authors (both later medieval and modern
authors) call dubitatio a trivial variant of positio, and thus spend little time
discussing it. For example, Paul of Venice [28] reduces dubitatio to positio
(in much the same way that he, and others, reduces depositio to dubitatio);
Swyneshed, Lavenham [36], John of Wesel [29], Richard Brinkley [38], and John
of Holland [21] do not mention dubitatio at all. However, such a trivializing
view of dubitatio fails to recognize the higher-order aspects of the disputation,
the mixing of both knowledge and truth, which result in a significantly more
difficult type of disputation. Just as positio is only interesting when the positum
is false, dubitatio is only interesting when the truth value of the dubitatum is
known (whether it is true or false) [46, 42]. Thus, the complexity of this type
of disputation partly arises from the interaction between knowledge, truth, and
the obligations of the Respondent, as the Respondent in many cases is required
to respond dubio ‘I doubt it’ to propositions that he actually knows.
A second cause of complexity in dubitatio is the fact that the rules, unlike
those for positio, are not deterministic. For example, Nicholas of Paris’s rules
for dubitatio [4, pp. 72–76] include the following:
• Just as in positio a positum put forward in the form of the positum, and
everything convertible to it in the time of positing is to be conceded and
its opposite and things convertible with it is to be denied and just as in
depositio a depositum put forward in the form of the depositum, with its
convertibles, must be denied and its opposite with things convertible with
it must be conceded; so in dubitatio for a dubitatum put forward in the
form of dubitatum and for its convertibles and moreover for the opposite of
the dubitatum with its convertibles must be answered “prove!” [4, p. 223].
• For everything irrelevant to the dubitatum the response must be according
to its quality.
• For everything antecedent to the dubitatum the response must be “false”
or “prove!” and never “true” [4, p. 224].
• For everything consequent to the dubitatum it is possible to reply “it is
true” or “prove” and never “it is false” [4, p. 224].
Whereas there is always a unique correct response for Respondent in positio (in
both the responsio antiqua and nova), here, the rules give Respondent a range
of choices. This non-determinacy means that there is a plurality of ways that
Respondent may act, and still be disputing according to the rules, a feature
which no other version of obligatio has. However, this feature of dubitatio seems
not to have been noticed by later authors who insisted that dubitatio could be
reduced to positio.
Nicholas’s dubitatio has similar formal properties to positio. Provided that
the dubitatum is neither a contradiction nor a tautology, it can be proved that
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the Respondent can win the disputation playing by Nicholas’s rules for dubitatio:
that is, there is never any case where he will be forced either to concede or to
deny the dubitatum [42, Theorem 24].
6.4 Impositio / Institutio / Appellatio
The obligation involved in impositio, also called institutio ‘institution’ or appel-
latio ‘appellation’, functions in a relevantly different manner from the obligation
in positio, depositio, or dubitatio. Whereas in these latter three, the Respon-
dent’s obligation involves how he is to respond to the obligatum, impositio in-
volves the redefinition (re-imposition) of certain terms or phrases.10 Impositio
can take place in conjunction with any of positio, depositio, and dubitatio; that
is, once a new imposition is introduced, then the Respondent may also further
be obliged to concede, deny, or doubt the initial obligatum of the disputation.
Sometimes the imposition is simple and straightforward:
I impose that ‘a’ signifies precisely that God exists. . . I impose that
this term ‘man’ may be converted with this word ‘donkey’, or I
impose that this proposition ‘God exists’ signifies precisely that man
is donkey [36, ¶¶2, 21].
In the first example, ‘a’ is being instituted as the name of a proposition that
signifies that God exists; likewise in the third example, the phrase ‘God exists’
is instituted as the name of a proposition signifying that man is donkey; thus
any time that ‘God exists’ is asserted in a disputation, it must be understood
as meaning ‘Man is donkey’. In the second example, the institution is not at
the level of propositions but at the level of words; it changes the meaning of the
term ‘man’ so that it no longer means ‘man’ but instead means ‘donkey’. Simple
impositions like these are relatively easy; the only skill they require beyond the
skills needed for positio is the skill to remember the new imposition of the term
or proposition. However, much more complicated examples can be provided,
such as the following (also due to Lavenham):
I impose that in every false proposition in which ‘a’ is put down that
it signifies only ‘man’ and that in every true proposition in which ‘a’
is put down that it signifies only ’donkey’, and that in every doubtful
proposition in which ‘a’ is put down that it signifies alternately with
this disjunction ‘man or non man’ [36, ¶24].
Now suppose that the proposition “Man is a” is put forward. The proposition
is either true, false, or of unknown truth value (doubtful). Suppose it is true.
Then, it means “Man is a donkey”, which is impossible; hence, contrary to
supposition, the proposition is in fact false. But if it is false, it means “Man
is man”—but this is true! Thus, if it cannot be true or false, then it must be
doubtful. But if it is doubtful, then it means “Man is man or not man”, which
is true, and hence not doubtful! No matter which assumption are made about
the value of the proposition, the Respondent is lead into contradiction.
10For example, the anonymous author of Obligationes Parisienses notes that “Institutio is
divided into certain institutio and uncertain or obscure institutio, for example if the name
‘Marcus’ is fixed that it might be a name of Socrates or Plato, but you would not know of
which” [8, p. 28] and Lavenham defines impositio as an “obligation by means of which a term
or proposition is assigned a [new] signification” [36, ¶21].
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6.5 Petitio.
In petitio, the Opponent asks (petitions) the Respondent to respond in a certain
way, for example, by conceding or denying the initial proposition. Petitio is
rarely treated at any length, because, as a number of authors (Nicholas of Paris
[4, p. 183], Marsilius of Inghen [22], Peter of Mantua [39], Paul of Venice [28,
pp. 38–39]) argue, petitio can be reduced to positio. Thus, from the disputational
point of view, there is little more than cosmetic differences between positio and
petitio.
6.6 Rei veritas / sit verum.
The sixth type, sit verum or rei veritas ‘the truth of things’, is rarely discussed
by the medieval authors, and sometimes not even explicitly defined. As a re-
sult, it is difficult to give a precise explanation or characterization of this type.
Many discussions of sit verum focus on epistemic aspects of the disputation [41,
p. 320]. For instance, Paul of Venice gives the following example of sit verum:
“Let it be true that you know that you are replying” [28, p. 45]. Nicholas of
Paris also gives an example of a rei veritas that cannot be sustained which is
couched in epistemic terms [4, pp. 166, 233]. However, one cannot generalized
too broadly from this, as other examples show more in common with counter-
factual reasoning than epistemic reasoning [44].
7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have given an overview of medieval logic which we hope is
sufficient to show that the Middle Ages were, in the history of logic, not a pe-
riod of darkness and crudeness, but rather one, particularly during the 13th and
14th centuries, of new insights into the nature of language and inference. These
insights, building on Aristotle’s Organon but going far beyond him, provided
a foundation for the formal education of centuries of young men, regardless of
whether they intended to continue their studies in philosophy. There is much
that we have not been able to address in great detail in this chapter, and still
more that we have not touched on at all. (For example, we have almost com-
pletely omitted developments of the syllogistic, both assertoric and modal, as
well as the interesting and complex question of how to deal with future con-
tingents.) Nevertheless, what we have shown is that the impact of logic and
the study of it in the Middle Ages therefore cannot be dismissed out of hand.
Modern study of medieval logic is still, to a large extent, in its early stages, and
decades to come will continue to prove the importance and sophistication of the
medieval logicians.
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